agent: code-atomiser-fix — broaden clipboard/paste guards to documented secondary windows

The Trust-3/Trust-6 fix in commit 7aee534 added ensure_main_window to
copy_to_clipboard, paste_text, and paste_text_replacing. That was over-
broad: the transcript-viewer and transcription-preview windows
legitimately call copy_to_clipboard (their "copy raw" / "copy
transcript" buttons), and the transcription-preview window legitimately
calls paste_text_replacing (the preview paste-to-foreground flow).

The original Trust-3/Trust-6 finding was about asymmetric exposure to
arbitrary windows, not about banning the documented secondary windows.
Fix: add ensure_window_in_set helper in commands::security, mirror the
allow-list against src-tauri/capabilities/secondary-windows.json so the
IPC trust boundary and the permission grant stay in lock-step.

  copy_to_clipboard         -> main + transcript-viewer + transcription-preview
  paste_text_replacing      -> main + transcription-preview
  paste_text                -> main only (unchanged; no secondary caller)

Adds two unit tests for ensure_window_in_set_label covering the
listed-label accept path and the unlisted-label reject path. The
existing Trust-3/Trust-6 tests remain in place and continue to assert
the size cap and the constants-equality invariant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

src-tauri/src/commands/clipboard.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 use arboard::Clipboard;
 
-use crate::commands::security::ensure_main_window;
+use crate::commands::security::ensure_window_in_set;
 
 /// Refuse-to-set-clipboard limit. 1 MiB is comfortably above any
 /// dictation output and any sensible "copy raw transcript" — anything
@@ -11,13 +11,24 @@ use crate::commands::security::ensure_main_window;
 /// identically.
 pub(crate) const MAX_CLIPBOARD_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
 
+/// Windows that are allowed to call `copy_to_clipboard`. The transcript
+/// viewer and transcription preview both have legitimate "copy raw text"
+/// buttons; mirror the secondary-windows capability grant in
+/// `src-tauri/capabilities/secondary-windows.json` so the IPC trust
+/// boundary and the permission set stay in lock-step.
+const CLIPBOARD_ALLOWED_WINDOWS: &[&str] =
+    &["main", "transcript-viewer", "transcription-preview"];
+
 /// Copy text to the system clipboard via arboard. Restricted to the
-/// main window and capped at `MAX_CLIPBOARD_BYTES` to keep the IPC
-/// surface symmetric with the rest of the codebase (Trust-6,
-/// 2026-05-12 code-atomiser fix).
+/// documented "clipboard-capable" windows (main + transcript-viewer +
+/// transcription-preview) and capped at `MAX_CLIPBOARD_BYTES` to keep the
+/// IPC surface symmetric with the rest of the codebase (Trust-6,
+/// 2026-05-12 code-atomiser fix; broadened on 2026-05-13 to cover the
+/// in-app preview/viewer copy buttons that were collateral-damaged by the
+/// original main-only restriction).
 #[tauri::command]
 pub fn copy_to_clipboard(window: tauri::WebviewWindow, text: String) -> Result<(), String> {
-    ensure_main_window(&window)?;
+    ensure_window_in_set(&window, CLIPBOARD_ALLOWED_WINDOWS)?;
     if text.len() > MAX_CLIPBOARD_BYTES {
         return Err(format!(
             "Clipboard payload too large ({} bytes; limit {} bytes).",

src-tauri/src/commands/paste.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ use arboard::Clipboard;
 use serde::Serialize;
 use tauri::Manager;
 
-use crate::commands::security::ensure_main_window;
+use crate::commands::security::{ensure_main_window, ensure_window_in_set};
+
+/// Windows allowed to invoke `paste_text_replacing`. The
+/// `transcription-preview` window's paste-to-foreground flow legitimately
+/// uses this command; mirror the secondary-windows capability grant in
+/// `src-tauri/capabilities/secondary-windows.json`.
+const PASTE_REPLACING_ALLOWED_WINDOWS: &[&str] = &["main", "transcription-preview"];
 
 /// Refuse-to-paste limit. Matches `commands::clipboard::MAX_CLIPBOARD_BYTES`
 /// (1 MiB) so paste and copy surfaces share a single rejection rule.
@@ -208,7 +214,7 @@ pub async fn paste_text_replacing(
     app: tauri::AppHandle,
     text: String,
 ) -> Result<PasteOutcome, String> {
-    ensure_main_window(&window)?;
+    ensure_window_in_set(&window, PASTE_REPLACING_ALLOWED_WINDOWS)?;
     if text.len() > MAX_PASTE_BYTES {
         return Err(format!(
             "Paste payload too large ({} bytes; limit {} bytes).",

src-tauri/src/commands/security.rs

@@ -12,9 +12,35 @@ pub fn ensure_main_window_label(label: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
     }
 }
 
+/// Reject the call unless the invoking window's label is one of `allowed`.
+///
+/// Use this for commands that are legitimately reachable from a small set of
+/// documented secondary windows (e.g. the transcript viewer or the
+/// transcription preview), where `ensure_main_window` would be over-broad
+/// and break in-app flows. The allowed set should always be a fixed
+/// `&[&'static str]` and should mirror an entry in
+/// `src-tauri/capabilities/*.json` — keeping the IPC trust boundary and the
+/// permission grant in lock-step.
+pub fn ensure_window_in_set(
+    window: &tauri::WebviewWindow,
+    allowed: &[&str],
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    ensure_window_in_set_label(window.label(), allowed)
+}
+
+pub fn ensure_window_in_set_label(label: &str, allowed: &[&str]) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if allowed.iter().any(|a| *a == label) {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(format!(
+            "This command is only available from {allowed:?} (got {label})."
+        ))
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::ensure_main_window_label;
+    use super::{ensure_main_window_label, ensure_window_in_set_label};
 
     #[test]
     fn accepts_main_window() {
@@ -27,4 +53,19 @@ mod tests {
             assert!(ensure_main_window_label(label).is_err());
         }
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ensure_window_in_set_accepts_listed_labels() {
+        let allowed = &["main", "transcript-viewer", "transcription-preview"];
+        for label in allowed {
+            assert!(ensure_window_in_set_label(label, allowed).is_ok());
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ensure_window_in_set_rejects_unlisted_label() {
+        let allowed = &["main", "transcript-viewer"];
+        assert!(ensure_window_in_set_label("tasks-float", allowed).is_err());
+        assert!(ensure_window_in_set_label("attacker-popup", allowed).is_err());
+    }
 }