The earlier Trust-1 commits a2b47db and a48653c carried the wrong
files due to parallel-agent races on the index. This commit re-applies
the fs.rs change via explicit pathspec so the working-tree edit is
finally landed in HEAD.
The Tauri command `write_text_file_cmd` previously took an arbitrary
`path: String` and flowed it straight into `tokio::fs::write` with no
main-window guard, no canonicalisation, and no scope check. A
compromised webview could write anywhere the process had write access
— overwriting shell init files, dropping a runner into
`~/.config/autostart`, etc.
This change:
- adds `ensure_main_window(&window)?` so only the main webview can
invoke the command;
- canonicalises the requested path's parent (rejecting nonexistent
parents and resolving symlinks) before joining the filename;
- asserts the canonical target sits inside an allowlisted base
(app data, app local data, downloads, documents, desktop), so a
`"../../etc/passwd"` payload — even one obtained via symlink trickery
in the chosen save dir — is refused with a clear error.
Six unit tests cover: outside-allowlist rejection, path-traversal
rejection, nested inside-allowlist acceptance, plain inside-allowlist
acceptance, nonexistent-parent rejection, and the pure
`is_inside_any_base` prefix check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jake
b3da58cd6b